What ever crushes individuality is despotism, no matter what name it is called. -Mill, John Stuart
Quotes :
- John Stuart Mill Р8/5/2017 Los ̼nicos que son felices son los que tienen sus mentes fijas en alg̼n objeto que no sea su propia felicidad. Frases de John Stuart Mill - 8/5/2017
- Frase celebre di John Stuart Mill «È meglio essere un uomo malcontento che un maiale soddisfatto, essere Socrate infelice piuttosto che un imbecille contento, e se l'imbecille e il maiale sono d'altro avviso ciò dipende dal fatto che vedono solo un lato della questione.» (John Stuart Mill)
- Ehe: die einzige wirkliche Leibeigenschaft, die das… Ehe: die einzige wirkliche Leibeigenschaft, die das Gesetz kennt. John Stuart Mill
- "In all intellectual debates, both sides tend… "In all intellectual debates, both sides tend to be correct in what they affirm, and wrong in what they deny." - John Stuart Mill
Une réponse à “What ever crushes individuality is despotism, no matter what name it is called. -Mill, John Stuart”
dicocitations
* Though doing no wrong to any one, a person may so act as to compel us to judge him, and feel to him, as a fool, or as a being of an inferior order: and since this judgment and feeling are a fact which he would prefer to avoid, it is doing him a service to warn him of it beforehand, as of any other disagreeable consequence to which he exposes himself. It would be well, indeed, if this good office were much more freely rendered than the common notions of politeness at present permit, and if one person could honestly point out to another that he thinks him in fault, without being considered unmannerly or presuming. (p. 95)
* We have a right, also, in various ways, to act upon our unfavourable opinion of any one, not to the oppression of his individuality, but in the exercise of ours. We are not bound, for example, to seek his society; we have a right to avoid it (though not to parade the avoidance), for we have a right to choose the society most acceptable to us. We have a right, and it may be our duty, to caution others against him, if we think his example or conversation likely to have a pernicious effect on those with whom he associates. We may give others a preference over him in optional good offices, except those which tend to his improvement. In these various modes a person may suffer very severe penalties at the hands of others for faults which directly concern only himself; but he suffers these penalties only in so far as they are the natural and, as it were, the spontaneous consequences of the faults themselves, not because they are purposely inflicted on him for the sake of punishment. A person who shows rashness, obstinacy, self-conceit — who cannot live within moderate means — who cannot restrain himself from hurtful indulgences — who pursues animal pleasures at the expense of those of feeling and intellect — must expect to be lowered in the opinion of others, and to have a less share of their favourable sentiments; but of this he has no right to complain, unless he has merited their favour by special excellence in his social relations, and has thus established a title to their good offices, which is not affected by his demerits towards himself. (pp. 95-96)
* If civilisation has got the better of barbarism when barbarism had the world to itself, it is too much to profess to be afraid lest barbarism, after having been fairly got under, should revive and conquer civilisation. A civilisation that can thus succumb to its vanquished enemy, must first have become so degenerate, that neither its appointed priests and teachers, nor anybody else, has the capacity, or will take the trouble, to stand up for it. If this be so, the sooner such a civilisation receives notice to quit the better. It can only go on from bad to worse, until destroyed and regenerated (like the Western Empire) by energetic barbarians. (p. 114)